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ABSTRACT
International courts (ICs) have not only been specifying States’ duties, but have
also contributed to the deﬁnition of States themselves. The article focuses on the
case-law of three ICs: the International Court of Justice qua generalist
international law court, and its making of the ‘internationalised State’; the
European Court of Human Rights qua regional human rights court, and its
moulding of the ‘democratic State’; and the Court of Justice of the European
Union qua court of a regional economic organisation, and its making of the
‘managerial State’. The ﬁrst part assesses the role of ICs in the development of
the international law of statehood. The second part identiﬁes the making of
the State in the three ICs’ case-law and compares the ways in which
statehood is actually performed through international jurisprudence. A third
part presents three critiques of the contemporary international jurisprudence
of statehood and explores ways to reform it.
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1. Introduction
Over the years, international courts (ICs) have not only been specifying the
existence, content and scope of States’ speciﬁc duties and responsibilities
under various regimes of international law, but, so-doing, they have also con-
tributed to the continuous legal deﬁnition and delineation of States
themselves.
That contribution of ICs’ case-law to the international law of statehood is
what one may refer to as the international ‘jurisprudence of statehood’. The
term ‘jurisprudence’ of statehood has been chosen for two reasons: ﬁrst, to
distinguish it from the more general regime of the international law of state-
hood, of which jurisprudence is just one part and a recent one, albeit an
important one, as we will see; and, second, to emphasise, given the encom-
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passing meaning of the term ‘jurisprudence’ in English, the importance of the
legal theoretical or philosophical work done by ICs with respect to the concept
of statehood.1
At ﬁrst sight, the topic may sound counterintuitive. After all, ICs are often
considered as the epitome of global governance and of international law-
making ‘beyond the State’.2 One would not expect them therefore to be
very interested in States except as one of the many ‘agents’ of enforcement
of international law, or to have contributed much to their conceptualisation
in international law. Most ICs, indeed, developed at a time at which inter-
national lawyers thought that international courts could deliver universal
justice through a single and globalised international law.3 Many scholars
even hoped ICs could help overcome the parochial divisions of international
politics, and especially those arising from what was perceived by them as the
common abuse of individual rights and interests by sovereign States.
As we now know, this post-war and especially post-1990s (and largely
European or Western) project has been short-lived. In many ways, indeed,
certain ICs may have successfully freed themselves from States or, at least,
forced themselves onto them in the making of international law. So-doing,
however, they have themselves become an instrument of international legal
managerialism, often imposed at the price of international politics.4
Based on this assessment, it has been rightly suggested that international
lawyers and scholars should take back the moral-political high ground of inter-
national law.5What they need to do is go back to central institutional or political
questions in international law.6 With this change of focus, most international
lawyers concerned with the political or institutional dimension of international
law have moved away from the study of ICs, leaving the latter to international
relations theorists and moral philosophers.7 They would be well advised,
however, not to disregard ICs too quickly. It is important, on the contrary, to
start by assessing what has been the contribution of ICs to international insti-
tutional law and then to identify ways of reforming their practice in the future.
The best place to start this new line of international institutional enquiry is,
I submit, to focus on ICs’ contribution to the international law of statehood.
1 See Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Harvard University Press, 1991) 90: ‘Jurisprudence is the general part
of adjudication, silent prologue to any decision at law’.
2 See José Alvarez, The Impact of International Organizations on International Law (Brill, 2017) 262ﬀ and esp
285ﬀ.
3 See Rene Urueña, ‘Law-Making through Comparative International Law?’ in R Liivoja and J Petman (eds),
International Law- Making: Essays in Honour of Jan Klabbers (Routledge, 2014) 149–61, 156ﬀ.
4 See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Global Governance and Public International Law’ (2004) 37 Kritische Justiz 241.
5 See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70
Modern Law Review 1; Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Politics of International Law – 20 Years Later’ (2009) 1
European Journal of International Law 7.
6 See Samantha Besson and José Luis Martí, ‘The Legitimate Actors of International Law-Making – Towards
a Theory of International Democratic Representation’ (2018) 9(3) Jurisprudence 503.
7 See eg, Nienke Grossman, Harlan Grant Cohen, Andreas Føllesdal and Geir Ulfstein (eds), Legitimacy and
International Courts (Cambridge University Press, 2018).
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There are many reasons for this. First of all, States were the ﬁrst international
law institutions and remain the most important ones today. True, this has
often been occulted by what one may refer to as everyday ‘anthropomorph-
ism’ in international law8 and the tendency to treat the State as one legal
‘subject’ or ‘actor’ among others rather than as an institution of international
law-making. To that extent, States are an inescapable component of what
some have misguidedly called politics or international law-making ‘beyond
the State’. They should therefore be the ﬁrst institution we should theorise
and mobilise in an eﬀort to approach the political and institutional structure
of international law, well before focusing on international organisations (IOs)
or other (non-State) ‘actors’. To do so, however, we need to know what the
international legal status of contemporary States is and cannot rely on a
largely mythological Westphalian international law of statehood.
Second, the contemporary international law of statehood is, although the
story is less well-known, largely a product of ICs’ jurisprudence. It is
indeed thanks to the Permanent Court of International Justice’s (PCIJ) and
the International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) early case-law that the main building
blocks of the international law of statehood were placed. They were followed
in this respect by other ICs in speciﬁc regimes of international law and in par-
ticular regions. Provided it is reformed, therefore, ICs’ case-law has the poten-
tial to contribute to the institutional debate in international law.
Finally, approaching ICs as makers of the international law of statehood is,
at ﬁrst sight, conceptually and normatively intriguing for two reasons. First,
one should mention the famous tension between law and politics regarding
the creation, modiﬁcation and dissolution of institutions such as States, and
the contested relevance and, by extension, justiﬁcation of (international)
law in this respect:9 it makes the question of whether there could actually
be judicial (international) law of statehood even more controversial. A
second reason to be interested is the alleged amour impossible between
States and ICs that have often been said to compete for the power to make
international law.10 Once international adjudication is approached as part
of international law-making albeit of a special kind, the question of who
8 See Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The Doctrine of Fundamental Rights of States and Anthropomorphic Thinking in
International Law’ (2015) 4(3) Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 501.
9 See Janis Grzybowski and Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law and Statehood: A Performative View’ in
R Schuett and PMR Stirk (eds), The Concept of the State in International Relations: Philosophy, Sovereignty
and Cosmopolitanism (Edinburgh University Press, 2015) 23–47; Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The International
Law of Statehood: Craftsmanship for the Elucidation and Regulation of Births and Deaths in the Inter-
national Society’ (2014) 29 Connecticut Journal of International Law 201; Jean d’Aspremont, International
Law as a Belief System (Cambridge University Press, 2018) 83; Jean d’Aspremont, ‘The International Law
of Statehood and Recognition: A Post-Colonial Invention’ in T Garcia (ed), La reconnaissance du statut
d’Etat à des entités contestées (Pedone, 2018) 15–28.
10 See Samantha Besson, ‘Legal Philosophical Issues of International Adjudication – Getting Over the
amour impossible between International Law and Adjudication’ in KJ Alter, CPR Romano, and Y
Shany (eds), The Oxford Handbook of International Adjudication (Oxford University Press, 2014) 413–34.
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between States and ICs should be making the international law of statehood
becomes even more interesting.
Of course, a complete assessment of the international jurisprudence of sta-
tehood would require a survey of the case-law of all ICs to which States are
subjected to. This goes well beyond the capacity of this article, however.
Instead, it focuses on the case-law of three ICs that have contributed to
three dimensions of the international law of statehood in contemporary
Europe: the ICJ qua sole universal and generalist international law court,
and its making of the ‘internationalised State’; the European Court of
Human Rights (ECtHR) qua regional human rights court, and its moulding
of the ‘democratic State’; and the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU) qua court of a regional economic international organisation, and its
making of the ‘managerial State’.
This article’s argument is three-pronged. In the ﬁrst part, it assesses the
current state of the international law of statehood and discusses what has
been the role of ICs in its development (2). The second part of the argument
delves deeper into each of the three selected ICs’ case-law in order to identify
how the making of the (respectively ‘internationalised’, ‘democratic’ and
‘managerial’) State works therein and to compare the ways in which statehood
is actually performed through international jurisprudence (3). A third section
of the article criticises the state of the international jurisprudence of statehood
and explores ways in which one could reform it (4).
In a nutshell, the proposal is, ﬁrst, to make the international jurisprudence
of statehood more comparative of the ways in which diﬀerent States work, and
hence to enhance its regional or universal justiﬁcation and overcome the
imperialism of the international law of statehood; second, to make it more
normatively critical, and hence to overcome both its original dogmatic self-
referentiality and the quasi-scientiﬁc or even economic objectivity it has
come to rely on over time; and, ﬁnally, to make the international jurispru-
dence of statehood more political, and hence to reveal the relationship of rep-
resentation that underpins statehood in international law and links it to both
governments and peoples and, thereby, to bring back political legitimacy con-
cerns at the core of the international law of statehood but also, by extension, of
international institutional law.
2. The state of the international law of statehood
2.1. The origins of the international law of statehood
The international law of statehood is the regime of international law that per-
tains to the institution that we call the State. As we will see below, its various
norms regulate the constitution and dissolution of States, but also their
various powers, rights, duties and responsibilities while they are in existence.
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Although they originally applied only to the external relations of States to one
another, they now also pertain to States’ internal organisation and to their
relations to their population.
Surprisingly, the international law of statehood is a recent regime of inter-
national law. Of course, modern international law was from its very origins a
law of and about States to the extent that States were, and arguably still are,
the primary makers of international law and international law was mostly
about their relations to one another. This relationship of mutual constitution
between States and international law is sometimes referred as immédiateté in
French to signal that one necessarily goes with the other. It is precisely,
however, because States were, for a long time, the only law-makers and legal
subjects of international law that it would have been tautological to even con-
sider a legal regime pertaining to statehood within international law itself.
True, the same self-referentiality could be said to apply, within modern
domestic law, between the State and its domestic legal order. And this has
not prevented domestic law from developing public law norms pertaining
to the organisation of the State, even if modern public law is a relatively
recent occurrence. If domestic law could regulate the State whose public
law it was, international law could a fortiori do the same for the many
States whose public law it was and a law which States shared as a condition
of their equal sovereignty. What explained the reluctance of classical inter-
national law to even grasp States as a legal concern was anthropomorphism.
That approach characterised the liberal conceptualisation of statehood that
dominated international law in the eighteenth, but also nineteenth Centuries.
On that conception, States in the international legal order were understood as
the natural persons of the domestic legal order. To that extent, their existence
was, like that of human beings and unlike that of the State in domestic law,
treated as an objective truth that could be established quasi-scientiﬁcally
(‘naturally’, one would have said) and did not depend on legal recognition.11
It is only in the late nineteenth Century, but even more clearly in the early
twentieth Century that international law started developing legal norms on
statehood. This occurred for two reasons and in two steps. First, with the civi-
lising mission of colonisation, but more clearly with what later became the
developing promise of decolonisation in the 1950s and 1960s, European
and then Western States, that had ventured outside of Europe and the
West, progressively universalised their institutional model by expanding it
to the rest of the world. That ‘import’ or ‘export’ enterprise and, depending
on the cases, imposition or reception of statehood occurred in various ways
in diﬀerent parts of the world.12 For that purpose, however, and in order to
11 See also d’Aspremont, ‘The International Law of Statehood’ (n 9).
12 See Martin van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State (Cambridge University Press, 1999); Bertrand
Badie, The Imported State: The Westernization of the Political Order (Stanford University Press, 2000).
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control and regulate the new States that were emerging, an international law
of statehood was required and gradually developed. It helped specifying the
criteria of statehood one could apply to identify new States in the image of
the original European ones.13 Common criteria of statehood were actually
already shared by most European philosophical traditions of statehood,
however diﬀerent those were in other respects.14 They had gradually gelled
into a common practice of Western States and, once universalised, became
a central piece of the new international law of statehood. In modern terms,
they are a distinct territory, a permanent population, an internally and exter-
nally eﬀective government, and independence.
Second, and a few years later, with the development of IOs, the need arose
to specify what those new international institutions’ rights, duties and respon-
sibilities would be and hence what kind of legal personality international law
should grant them. This required delineating IOs from States, and this became
the second role of the international law of statehood. That delineation
occurred by emphasising the original, plenary and general nature of States’
rights and powers by opposition to the derivative, limited and relative
rights and powers of IOs, thereby re-aﬃrming States’ priority as immediate
subjects of international law.
Those two roles of the international law of statehood, ie, deﬁning statehood
and delineating it, are still at play today. Of course, the circumstances of state-
hood and other international institutions have changed, but the need to
control statehood and to organise the State’s relations to other institutions
is even stronger nowadays than it was in the twentieth Century. Indeed,
new States keep emerging, albeit in diﬀerent contexts; IOs have become
more autonomous and inter-relate; and other international institutional
actors have arisen whose legal personality is still in question.
As a matter of fact, the two roles of the international law of statehood are
often combined these days. This is because, ﬁrst of all, IOs are now participat-
ing in the deﬁnition of statehood.15 This is done through their ICs provided
they have courts, but not only. Those ICs have indeed contributed to turning
their IO’s Member States into instruments to serve the functions that those
very States vested the IO with in the ﬁrst place. Secondly, Member States
have become deeply integrated to one another in their (supranational) IO.
This has led the legal personality of all Member States and, arguably, that
of their organisation itself to evolve together towards a new kind of integrated
legal personality.
13 See Judge Forster, Separate Opinion, ICJ, Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] ICJ Rep 1975 12, p
103: ‘[Africa’s] institutions should be a carbon copy of European institutions’.
14 See Quentin Skinner, ‘The Sovereign State: A Genealogy’ in Q Skinner and H Kalmo (eds), Sovereignty in
Fragments: The Past, Present, and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge University Press, 2010) 26–
46.
15 See Guy Fiti Sinclair, To Reform the World. International Organizations and the Making of Modern States
(Cambridge University Press, 2017).
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While the international law of statehood ﬁrst pertained to the regulation of
States’ relations in the international legal order, it has gradually evolved, since
the end of the Second World War and with the development of international
human rights law, but especially since the end of the ColdWar, to also address
the internal organisation of the State itself, and in particular issues of insti-
tutional organisation and political regime. This echoed a corresponding
change in the domestic public law of statehood that took place, depending
on the States, mostly in the early or second half of the twentieth Century,
ie, the re-discovery of popular sovereignty, and of the inherent democratic
limits on State authority as legitimate authority, and the entrenchment of con-
stitutional democracy. From that moment onwards, the distinction between
the international and the domestic laws of statehood has become increasingly
moot.
2.2. The role of international courts in the international law of
statehood
ICs were the ﬁrst international law-making forum in which the international
law of statehood was consolidated as a regime of international law in the
twentieth Century. Their contribution to the international jurisprudence of
statehood started with decisions or opinions by arbitral tribunals, and the Per-
manent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in particular.16 Those were later followed
by the case-law of the PCIJ17 and the ICJ, and more recently of other ICs.
Thanks to their dispute-settlement and advisory powers, ICs have contrib-
uted, in their interpretation of international law, to the identiﬁcation of the
practice of States with respect to statehood. So-doing, they have either vali-
dated that practice as customary international law or general principles,18
or justiﬁed existing customary international law or general principles by
enhancing their legitimacy. Once those customary norms and principles
were codiﬁed, as they were in the case of certain ﬁelds of the international
law of statehood such as the law of succession or immunities, ICs have con-
tributed to the further interpretation of those treaties or other forms of ‘pro-
gressive development’ codiﬁcations such as those of the International Law
Commission (ILC).19
16 See eg, PCA, Island of Palmas (or Miangas) (The Netherlands / The United States of America) (Merits)
[1928] PCA Case no 1925-01, pp 7–10.
17 See Ole Spiermann, ‘General Legal Characteristics of States: A View from the Past of the Permanent
Court of International Justice’ in C Chinkin and F Baetens (eds), Sovereignty, Statehood and State Respon-
sibility: Essays in Honour of James Crawford (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 144–52.
18 See Donald Regan, ‘International Adjudication: A Response to Paulus – Courts, Custom, Treaties,
Regimes, and the WTO’ in S Besson and J Tasioulas (eds), The Philosophy of International Law
(Oxford University Press, 2010) 225–41.
19 See eg, Alain Pellet, ‘Shaping the Future of International Law: The Role of the World Court in Law-
Making’ in MH Arsanjani et al. (eds), Looking to the Future. Essays on International Law in Honor of
W. Michael Reisman (Martinus Nijhoﬀ Publishers, 2010) 1065–84.
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Of course, since then, other international institutions than ICs, and
especially other organs or agents of IOs, have also contributed to the develop-
ment of the international law of statehood. It has been the case most clearly of
the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and Security Council through
their various resolutions,20 but also of other bodies like the World Bank.21
Here again, ICs have been called to refer to those bodies’ resolutions and to
interpret them, thereby participating in the consolidation of the general inter-
national law of statehood.
There are many reasons for the speciﬁc role played historically by ICs’ jur-
isprudence in the making of the international law of statehood, especially
compared to other international law-making processes such as treaties or
binding IO resolutions. A ﬁrst explanation may be that the international
law of statehood developed and consolidated at a time, as I explained
before, where besides international treaties among States, there were very
few other universal international fora where such law could be made or, at
least, customary international law could be identiﬁed, interpreted and
justiﬁed.22 IOs were few and hardly any of their resolutions were binding.
Treaties were diﬃcult to conclude on issues where States were unequally situ-
ated or between States and ‘non-self-governing entities’ claiming to be States.
A second, and related, reason had to do with the ways in which issues in the
international law of statehood arose, ie, in concrete cases and mostly in con-
tentious ones. The dispute resolution power or, at least, advisory power of the
ICJ was uniquely situated therefore to contribute to the making of the inter-
national law of statehood. Finally, one should also mention the kind of legal
reasoning ICs can resort to and its particular adequacy to the conceptualis-
ation of statehood in international law. Issues of statehood are not only
abstract and diﬃcult normatively, but, to the extent that statehood is a con-
stitutive feature of the international legal order, settling them also requires
a clear theoretical conception of the structure and justiﬁcation of that order.
True, it is not uncommon for ICs to be said to contribute to the so-called
‘development’ of general international law23 and to be criticised for it.
Without surprise, therefore, similar critiques have been raised against the
international jurisprudence of statehood. The ﬁrst critique echoes a general
one that pertains to the existence and the legitimacy of the law-making
20 Se eg, on Kosovo: Jean d’Aspremont, ‘Regulating Statehood: The Kosovo Status Settlement’ (2007) 20
Leiden Journal of International Law 649.
21 Se eg, World Bank, World Development Report 1997: The State in a Changing World (Oxford University
Press, 1997), p iii, 17.
22 See Ingo Venzke, ‘The International Court of Justice during the Battle for International Law (1955–1975)
– Colonial Imprints and Possibilities for Change’ in J von Bernstorﬀ and P Dann (eds), The Battle for Inter-
national Law in the Decolonization Era (2019) (forthcoming).
23 See Bing Bing Jia, ‘International Case Law in the Development of International Law’, (2017) 382 Collected
Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 175; Christian J Tams, ‘The ICJ as a “Law-Formative
Agency”: Summary and Synthesis’ in CJ Tams and J Sloan (eds), The Development of International Law by
the International Court of Justice (Oxford University Press, 2013) 377–96.
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powers of ICs.24 A second critique pertains to the theoretical, and some may
even argue logical incoherence or lack of plausibility of having courts, that are
themselves secondary institutions of international law-making, deciding over
other secondary rules or principles of international law and even applying
other secondary rules of international law to decide over them.25
This is not the place to expand at great length about either of those cri-
tiques. Let me say, however, with respect to the ﬁrst issue, that it is made
even more interesting by the fact that States and ICs are usually described
as institutions competing for the right to make international law.26 If ICs
are to be seen as vested with the power to mould States themselves through
the making of the international law of statehood, then their law-making
power clearly becomes even more controversial. Once the ﬁctive personal
nature of the State is clariﬁed, however, and especially the role of law in sus-
taining that institutional ﬁction, there is nothing surprising in the role inter-
national law is called to play in the making of the international State,
including through the international judiciary. Of course, we should not over-
estimate or single out the legal dimension of any institution, including state-
hood, but this does not mean we should underestimate it either. Furthermore,
the fact that ICs are themselves legally constituted by States as competing
international law-makers does not make the argument circular: it merely
reﬂects the fact that even though States are still our main legal institutions
both at the domestic and international level, they are no longer our sole insti-
tutional representatives internationally. The identity of the international insti-
tutions in charge of making the international law of statehood should
therefore reﬂect that evolution.
As to the second critique, while it is correct to be concerned about the
coherence of arguments in which secondary rules are routinely invoked by
ICs to decide over other secondary rules, it does not seem to cut any ice
with respect to the jurisprudence of statehood. To the extent, as I argued
before, that States themselves can make international law about statehood
and that ICs can also contribute as international institutions to that law-
making process, it is diﬃcult to see how this could occur outside the frame-
work of international law-making itself and its respective sources. Of
course, those law-making processes rely quite self-referentially for their
working on the existence of States. However, this kind of self-referentiality
is not perceived as problematic domestically where parliaments and courts
are constituted by law and decide over constitutional matters of statehood,
and there is no reason it should be considered more problematic
24 See d’Aspremont, ‘Statehood and Recognition’ (n 9); d’Aspremont, ‘The International Law of Statehood’
(n 9).
25 See Jean d’Aspremont ‘The International Court of Justice and the Irony of System-Design’ (2017) 8(2)
Journal of International Dispute Settlement 366.
26 See the discussion in Besson, ‘Legal Philosophical Issues of International Adjudication’ (n 10).
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internationally. Quite the contrary, actually, to the extent that there is more
than one State in the international legal order.
A third, and more speciﬁc critique of ICs’ jurisprudence of statehood has
been the lack of customary international law on statehood, at least before ICs
issued most of their judgments or opinions on that law. It pertains therefore to
the largely ‘mythological’ references to such pre-existing sources in ICs’ case-
law.27 That critique is usually launched with respect to the widespread refer-
ences to the 1933 Montevideo Convention in this context. To the extent that it
pertains to the invocation of the latter’s role as a ‘repository’ of alleged cus-
tomary criteria of statehood, to quote d’Aspremont,28 that critique needs to
be taken seriously. It does not aﬀect the validity or legitimacy of ICs’ jurispru-
dence of statehood per se, however.
To start with, the reason the Montevideo Convention has been repeatedly
invoked as source or, at least, as evidence of the four criteria of statehood
mentioned before is not as mysterious as it sounds. It is indeed the only
written provision we have to date pertaining to those criteria in international
law. As a matter of fact, it not so surprising that the Montevideo Convention
even included a provision on the criteria of statehood in the ﬁrst place. Of
course, the intent of the Latin American States parties was clearly not to
spell out a universal conception of statehood, but to strike a clean break
from the then European international law’s civilising and hence subjective
approach to statehood and its recognition. The criteria of statehood listed
in the Montevideo Convention were, however, common to many theories
of the modern State in diﬀerent Western political and legal cultures and
were actually practised in those States and domestic legal orders.
That being said, it is important to emphasise that the Montevideo Conven-
tion itself could not be considered as customary, even at the regional level. As
the ICJ argued in the Asylum case, the Convention had not been very broadly
ratiﬁed in Latin America where it applied, and, even there, it could not be said
to have customary value.29 As a matter of fact, unlike countless international
law textbooks and certain international law scholars,30 ICs have only rarely
referred to the Montevideo Convention as evidence of the customary
nature of the international law of statehood.31
27 See d’Aspremont (n 25).
28 See d’Aspremont, International Law as a Belief System (n 9) 79–86; Thomas D Grant, ‘Deﬁning Statehood:
The Montevideo Convention and its Discontents’ (1998–9) 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational and
International Law 403.
29 See ICJ, Asylum (Colombia v Peru) (Merits) [1950] ICJ Rep 266, paras 274–8 and 277.
30 See eg, David Bederman, The Spirit of International Law (University of Georgia Press, 2002), 49; Jure
Vidmar, ‘The Concept of the State and its Right of Existence’ (2015) 4 Cambridge Journal of International
and Comparative Law 547.
31 For an exception, albeit an arbitral and ancient one, see Germano-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal,
Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v Polish State (1929) 5 Annual Digest of Public International
Law Cases 11.
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Of course, this third critique rightly points to the dogmatic and, one may
argue, quasi-theological way in which the international jurisprudence of sta-
tehood has developed in general, even outside of references to the Montevideo
Convention. Importantly, however, what one may refer to as the performative
legality or ‘self-fulﬁlling legalism’ of statehood should not necessarily come as
a surprise. Again, the same may be said of the domestic (constitutional) law of
statehood to the extent that modern domestic law is the law of a State, and
vice-versa.
3. International courts’ jurisprudence of statehood
3.1. A map of the international jurisprudence of statehood
This section proposes a comparative presentation of the jurisprudence of sta-
tehood by three selected ICs: the ICJ, the ECtHR and the CJEU. This makes
for an interesting comparison between the case-law of a universal and general-
ist IC (the ICJ), and that of two regional and specialised ICs in Europe: one in
the ﬁeld of European human rights law (the ECtHR) and the other in that of
European Union (EU) law (the CJEU).
Broaching the ICJ’s jurisprudence of statehood ﬁrst is a necessity given its
central contribution to the development of the international law of statehood.
As the only generalist IC in existence, the international law of statehood
clearly belonged from the very beginning to the PCIJ’s and the ICJ’s core
material jurisdiction. Those two courts’ universal jurisdiction also provided
them with the ability to internationalise statehood and a certain regime
thereof. Focusing then on two regional ICs is a testimony to the importance
of regional courts among ICs today and to their role in the development of
general international law. Of course, the regional, but also the material
focus of those two ICs aﬀects the kind of theories of statehood underpinning
their respective jurisprudence. Given the importance of trade and human
rights among the regimes of specialised ICs, however, one may consider
those two ICs as being representative of specialised international jurispru-
dence in Europe.
There are three ways in which the international jurisprudence of statehood
has grown from the identiﬁcation and interpretation of international law by
ICs. ICs may, ﬁrst of all, be interpreting the international law of statehood
stricto sensu, as it is the case when they are applying general rules or principles
of international law on State recognition or succession, be they customary or
treaty-based. To the extent that the international law of statehood is part of
general international law, it is applicable by all ICs. Secondly, ICs may also
develop the international law of statehood through their interpretations of
other general rules of international law such as international responsibility
law or international law on sources. To the extent that those other areas of
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general international law apply to all States and in all regimes of international
law, they belong to the law applied and interpreted by all three ICs. ICs may
also, ﬁnally, be deriving rules and principles pertaining to statehood from the
interpretation of another regime of international law, and especially from
their own special regime in the case of specialised ICs.
ICs’ jurisprudence of statehood may be organised under two main axes or
dimensions of statehood in international law that correspond to the two aims
and genealogical layers of the international law of statehood identiﬁed before:
ﬁrst, deﬁning and, second, delineating statehood.
The ﬁrst axis in the international jurisprudence of statehood pertains to
deﬁning statehood stricto sensu. It covers four sets of issues:
i The ﬁrst set pertains to the constitutive features or criteria of statehood,
and in particular a distinct territory, a permanent population, internal
and external eﬀective government, and independence.
ii The second set of issues relates to the beginning and the end of state-
hood. They cover questions related to self-determination, secession,
recognition, on the one hand, and to succession or continuity, on
the other.
iii The third group of questions has to do with the jurisdiction or powers of
states, their rights, duties and responsibilities. States’ powers are usually
characterised as being comprehensive, exclusive and supreme and are
grounded primarily on territory (territorial jurisdiction), but also
extend beyond the oﬃcial territory on grounds of nationality (personal
jurisdiction), domestic interest (protective jurisdiction) or collective
interest (universal jurisdiction). Among the rights of States, one
should mention diplomatic protection and immunities in particular.
iv The fourth set of issues is also the most recent one in the inter-
national jurisprudence of statehood and pertains to the internal
organisation of the State. That jurisprudence focuses on the rules
and principles that ensure the self-limitation of States and ground
their legitimate authority. One may distinguish between those rules
and principles that pertain to the political regime and those that
relate to other aspects of political organisation. The former entail
principles such as, for instance, democracy, rule of law, separation
of powers, judicial review, parliamentarism or proportional represen-
tation. International norms pertaining to political organisation
include, among others, federalism, devolution, decentralisation, civil
society or political parties.
The second axis in the international jurisprudence of statehood pertains to
the delineation of States and the relations between States and other inter-
national law institutions and/or subjects:
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i The ﬁrst relation to be regulated under the international jurisprudence of
statehood has been the relation between States and IOs.
ii The second relationship is that between States and private actors. The
latter include non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational
corporations or armed groups, but the list is non-exhaustive and is
deﬁned negatively by reference to States themselves. Among the issues
addressed by this sub-set of rules and principles of the international jur-
isprudence of statehood, one ﬁnds issues pertaining to those actors’ legal
personality, but also to the delineation of their respective responsibility
regimes and States’ duties of due diligence with respect to them.
To the extent that the international jurisprudence of statehood has devel-
oped with ICs themselves, its history matches that of ICs. This also goes for
the specialisation and fragmentation of the international jurisprudence of sta-
tehood, therefore, depending on the IC and its regime. This has consequences
for the international law of statehood that nowadays knows of diﬀerent
interpretations depending on the regions and the regimes considered. Of
course, as often in cases of conﬂicting jurisprudential interpretations of
general rules of international law, the IC whose jurisprudence is most author-
itative is the ICJ’s. As we will see, regional and specialised ICs, like the ECtHR
or the CJEU, usually refer and sometimes even defer to the ICJ on matters
related to the international law of statehood. Their special jurisdiction does
not prevent them from providing diﬀerent interpretations in certain cases,
however, and, even more importantly, from developing, in the absence of
ICJ case-law, a conception of statehood speciﬁc to their legal regime.
Of course, some of those diﬀerences may also be explained by reference to
causes or reasons lying outside of their speciﬁc international law regime. A
ﬁrst ground for variations between the three ICs’ jurisprudence may lie in
the jurisdiction of each court, and in particular diﬀerences between their per-
sonal, temporal or territorial scope. The latter aﬀects the kind of questions
raised before an IC and the type of individual, State or IO interests defended
before it, depending on whether individuals have legal standing or not and,
even when they do, on how the IC’s jurisprudence varies between such
cases and those decided upon an interstate application. A second explanation
may be the type of control and review each IC exercises, and in particular
whether it is contentious or advisory. In turn, variations in the authority of
an IC’s decisions inﬂuence their content in the ﬁrst place. A third ground
relates to the compulsory nature of the jurisdiction of some ICs, while that
of most others remains optional.
A fourth reason may reside in the period in which each IC’s case-law was
established and how it reacted to the state of the international law at that time.
This is particularly important to understand the diﬀerences between various
stages in the PCIJ’s and ICJ’s jurisprudence of statehood that spans over very
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distinct eras of international law, ranging from the height of Western imperi-
alism, through post-colonialism,32 to this day. It also matters to understand
diﬀerences between the PCIJ/ICJ’s jurisprudence and that of the other two
ICs that are post-war courts and whose jurisprudence bears the mark of the
end of the Cold War in particular. A ﬁfth, and related, ground pertains to
the localisation of the IC and its territorial and hence scope of authority in
relation to statehood. This inﬂuences the kind of either universal or regional
(in this case, European) justiﬁcations that have to be provided for any given
interpretation of statehood.
A ﬁnal explanation for diﬀerences in the respective jurisprudences of state-
hood may lie in the institutional framework of the IC itself, and especially
whether it is merely established by a treaty and the latter’s States parties or
whether it is the judicial organ of an IO. This does not only matter for the
IC’s jurisprudence pertaining to the relations between Member States and
the given IO, but also to statehood itself to the extent that it often reﬂects
the IO’s (other organs’) conception of statehood. That relation to an IO
also matters for the extent to which the IC is vested with judicial law-
making powers and their subsidiary nature or not. For instance, the CJEU
is famous for its constitutional law-making powers over the EU and its
Member States, and those powers can be contrasted with the ECtHR’s subsidi-
ary control within the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
system.
3.2. Three international courts and their respective conception of
statehood
3.2.1. The ICJ and the internationalised State
The ICJ’s jurisprudence of statehood has its roots in the early twentieth
Century PCIJ’s judgments and opinions,33 and has built on them from
1945 onwards. It spans therefore over more than a century, and this long tra-
dition shows in both its scope and content.
What characterises the ICJ’s jurisprudence of statehood has been the ‘inter-
nationalisation’ of the Western, and especially European at ﬁrst, notion of sta-
tehood to the rest of the world thanks to its authority as the sole generalist and
universal court of international law. What this means, more speciﬁcally, is
that the Western legal criteria of statehood have been identiﬁed, speciﬁed
and then universalised through that case-law, and not only interpreted
32 See Shabtai Rosenne, ‘Decolonisation in the International Court of Justice’ (1996) 8 African Journal of
International and Comparative Law 564.
33 Such as the cases, PCIJ, Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco on Nov. 8th, 1921 (Advisory
Opinion) [1923] PCIJ Rep Series B No 4; PCIJ, S.S. Wimbledon (UK v Japan) (Merits) [1923] PCIJ Rep
Series A No 1; PCIJ, Status of Eastern Carelia (Advisory Opinion) [1923] PCIJ Rep Series B No 5; PCIJ,
S.S. Lotus (France v Turkey) (Merits) [1927] PCIJ Rep Series A No 10; PCIJ, Legal Status of Eastern Greenland
(Denmark v Norway) (Merits) [1933] PCIJ Rep Series A/B No 53.
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through international jurisprudence once they had been universalised. Non-
Western States and so-called ‘non-self-governing entities’ that did not know
of statehood in the modern sense—or, at least, not in the way it was conceived
by international law—were subjected to those criteria as if they did. Nowa-
days, one may consider that the criteria of statehood are formally internatio-
nalised and that, as I explained before, they have become an integral part of
international customary law partly thanks to the international jurisprudence
of statehood. The process of internationalisation of statehood carries on,
however, with respect to new aspects of the international law of statehood,
as we will see, and through the international jurisprudence pertaining to them.
Of course, the ICJ has also been a reluctant ‘internationaliser’ of statehood
at times. It has famously left certain issues undecided, as with respect to the
exact regime of succession to treaties.34 It has also carefully kept some ques-
tions at bay by delineating its jurisdiction in certain ways, as exempliﬁed by its
decision not to determine the existence of a right to secession and to become a
State.35 True, in many of those cases, the ICJ’s self-restraint matched the inde-
terminacy of the international law of statehood. The international law of rec-
ognition is a case in point in this respect.36
Without surprise in view of its universalising eﬀects, the ICJ’s jurispru-
dence of statehood has been characterised by the many individual opinions
of judges and the plurality of divergent theoretical and cultural conceptions
of statehood they have expressed. It is the case, for instance, of the separate
opinions by Judges Ammoun, Boni and Forster in Western Sahara,37 by
Judge Ajibola in Territorial Dispute Libya v Chad38 or by Judge Weeramantry
in Bosnian Genocide.39 It is interesting to note that most of them pertain to
those very issues in the international law of statehood over which inter-
national law was indeterminate before the ICJ’s decision. One may have
indeed considered before the ICJ’s opinion in Western Sahara that the per-
sonal jurisdiction of a political institution over its people could matter as
much as its territorial jurisdiction when deciding over the existence of a
State, and maybe even more so.40 And one could have hoped before the
34 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Merits) [2007] ICJ Rep 43, paras 67ﬀ.
35 ICJ, Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo
(Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep 403, paras 49–56 and 82–3.
36 See Tom Grant, ‘How to Recognize a State (and not): Some Practical Considerations’ in C Chinkin and F
Baetens (eds), Sovereignty, Statehood and State Responsibility: Essays in Honour of James Crawford (Cam-
bridge University Press, 2015) 192–208.
37 Judges Ammoun, Forster, and Boni, Separate Opinions, ICJ, Western Sahara (n 13) 83, 103, and 173.
38 Judge Ajibola, Separate Opinion, ICJ, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v Chad) (Merits) [1994]
ICJ Rep 6, pp 51–92.
39 Judge Weeramantry, Separate Opinion, ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) (Preliminary Objec-
tions) [1996] ICJ Rep 595, pp 640ﬀ.
40 ICJ, Western Sahara (n 13).
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Bosnian Genocide judgment that State succession to certain humanitarian
treaties could be deemed automatic.41
Based on the analytical map of the international jurisprudence of statehood
presented in the previous section, the ICJ has contributed to both dimensions
of the international law of statehood. The second is, of course, less developed
but it also corresponds to a more recent dimension of the international law of
statehood generally and there are inherent limitations to the ICJ’s personal
and material jurisdiction that prevent it from addressing those issues directly.
With respect to statehood tout court, ﬁrst of all, the ICJ’s jurisprudence has
focused for the longest period on the identiﬁcation and interpretation of the
criteria of statehood. The emphasis was placed, at ﬁrst, on nationality, thanks
to diplomatic protection cases in particular.42 Territoriality also quickly
became a central piece of the ICJ’s statehood jurisprudence, and in particular
regarding issues of title,43 border delimitation44 or regime.45 One should
especially mention cases pertaining to: the creation of States, and in particular
self-determination and secession;46 their extinction, and in particular succes-
sion as opposed to continuity;47 and their recognition.48 A third group of con-
cerns in the ICJ’s jurisprudence of statehood has been the jurisdiction of
41 ICJ, Bosnian Genocide (n 34).
42 ICJ, Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) (Second Phase) [1955] ICJ Rep 4, pp 22–3; ICJ, Barcelona
Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v Spain) (New Application: 1962) (Second Phase)
[1970] ICJ Rep 3, paras 28–58; ICJ, Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v Democratic Republic of the
Congo) (Merits) [2010] ICJ Rep 639, para 65.
43 ICJ, Corfu Channel case (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, pp 18 and 35; ICJ, Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau
Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia v Singapore) (Merits) [2008] ICJ Rep 12, paras 273–7,
289–90, and 295–9; ICJ, Territorial and Maritime Dispute between Nicaragua and Honduras in the Carib-
bean Sea (Nicaragua v Honduras) (Merits) [2007] ICJ Rep 659, paras 159, 162, and 172–208.
44 ICJ, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey) (Merits) [1978] ICJ Rep 3, paras 58–9; ICJ, North Sea
Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany v Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany v Nether-
lands) (Merits) [1969] ICJ Rep 1969 3, para 46; ICJ, Continental Shelf (Tunisia v Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)
(Merits) [1982] ICJ Rep 18, paras 99–101; ICJ, Territorial Dispute (Libyan v Chad) (n 38) paras 23–34, 42–5,
and 57; ICJ, Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v Republic of Mali) (Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 554, paras 20–6; ICJ,
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador v Honduras: Nicaragua intervening) (Merits) [1990]
ICJ Rep 92, paras 82–4; ICJ, Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain
(Qatar v Bahrain) (Merits) [2001] ICJ Rep 2001 40, paras 36–69, 165, 205–9, and 240; ICJ, Land and Mar-
itime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening)
(Merits) [2002] ICJ Rep 303, paras 31–9, 65, and 207–9; ICJ, Maritime Delimitation in the Caribbean
Sea And The Paciﬁc Ocean (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) and Land Boundary in the Northern Part of Isla Por-
tillos (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Merits) [2018] not published yet, paras 59ﬀ.
45 ICJ, International Status of South West Africa (Advisory Opinion) [1950] ICJ Rep 128, pp 131–42 and 150–
5; ICJ, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (Namibia) not-
withstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, paras 52, 100,
118–119, and 131; ICJ, Western Sahara (n 13) paras 87ﬀ.
46 ICJ, South West Africa (n 45); ICJ, Western Sahara (n 13) paras 54ﬀ; ICJ, East Timor (Portugal v Australia)
(Merits) [1995] ICJ Rep 1995 90, paras 29ﬀ; ICJ, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the
Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory Opinion) [2004] ICJ Rep 136, para 88; ICJ, Kosovo (n 35) paras
79ﬀ; ICJ, Legal Consequences from the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 (Advisory Opinion)
[2019] ICJ Rep 1.
47 ICJ, Bosnian Genocide (n 39); ICJ, Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v Slovakia) (Merits) [1997] ICJ
Rep 1997 7.
48 ICJ, Namibia (n 45) paras 123–7; ICJ, Kosovo (n 35) paras 51–2; ICJ, Frontier Dispute (n 44) paras 20–6; ICJ,
Nuclear Tests (Australia v France) (Merits) [1974] ICJ Rep 253, paras 47ﬀ.
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States, and in particular the scope and content of their territorial and personal
jurisdiction,49 but also of universal jurisdiction.50
An area in which the ICJ’s jurisprudence of statehood has remained limited is
the internal organisation of States, and in particular the latter’s regime and pol-
itical organisation. For instance, the Court chose to hide behind the inter-tem-
poral rule in international law not to recognise members of the mandate system
in South West Africa, subjected to South African apartheid, any right to require
the due performance of the Mandate in discharge of the ‘sacred trust’.51 It also
famously refused to consider that international customary law committed a
State to hold free elections.52 To this date, the ICJ has remained agnostic
about such issues leaving them to other more specialised ICs or even non-judi-
cial bodies whose authority it considers established under international law.53
A second tier of judgments and opinions by the ICJ pertains to the relations
of States to IOs and private actors. With respect to IOs, ﬁrst of all, the ICJ has
famously clariﬁed the characteristics of the legal personality of States when
compared to that of IOs.54 It has also contributed, at the same time, to speci-
fying what in the international law of statehood, and especially the powers,
rights, duties and responsibilities of States, could be transposed mutatis
mutandis to IOs.55 Further, the ICJ has contributed to the universalisation
and entrenchment of the private/public distinction in international statehood
law, and hence to the speciﬁcation of the relations between States and private
actors. This has happened mostly through its jurisprudence on the attribution
of conduct of private agents to States in international responsibility law, ie, a
large part of the one third of ICJ cases that pertains to State responsibility.56
This has also taken place through the ICJ’s case-law on the immunities of the
members of the ‘triad’ considered as speciﬁc State organs.57
49 ICJ, Asylum (n 29) pp 274–8.
50 ICJ, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v Senegal) (Merits) [2012] ICJ
Rep 422, paras 74ﬀ; ICJ, Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium)
(Merits) [2002] ICJ Rep 3, paras 41ﬀ.
51 ICJ, South West Africa (Liberia v South Africa) (Merits) [1962] ICJ Rep 319.
52 ICJ, Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v United States of America)
(Merits) [1986] ICJ Rep 14, paras 258ﬀ.
53 ICJ, Diallo (n 42) para 65.
54 ICJ, Reparation for Injuries Suﬀered in the Service of the United Nations (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 174, pp
178–80; ICJ, Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter) (Advisory
Opinion) [1962] ICJ Rep 151, pp 167–8; ICJ, Diﬀerence Relating to Immunity from Legal Process of a
Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights (Advisory Opinion) [1999] ICJ Rep 62, paras 62ﬀ.
55 ICJ, UN Reparation (n 54) pp 178ﬀ; ICJ, Certain Expenses (n 54) pp 167ﬀ; ICJ, Interpretation of the Agree-
ment of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and Egypt (Advisory Opinion) [1980] ICJ Rep 73, paras 46ﬀ; ICJ,
Special Rapporteur (n 54) paras 62ﬀ.
56 ICJ, Nicaragua v United States of America (n 52), 113ﬀ; ICJ, United States Diplomatic and Consular Staﬀ in
Teheran (United States of America v Iran) (Merits) [1980] ICJ Rep 3, paras 69–75 and 92; ICJ, LaGrand
(Germany v United States of America) (Merits) [2001] ICJ Rep 446, para 28; ICJ, Armed Activities on the
Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Uganda) (Merits) [2005] ICJ Rep 168, paras
172–80; ICJ, Bosnian Genocide (n 39) paras 385ﬀ.
57 ICJ, Arrest Warrant (n 50) paras 52ﬀ; ICJ, Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v Italy, Greece
intervening) (Merits) [2012] ICJ Rep 99, paras 52ﬀ.
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3.2.2. The ECtHR and the democratic State
The international law of statehood does not belong to the core of the ECtHR’s
mandate to the extent that the ECHR does not materially regulate statehood.
All the same, the Court’s interpretation of the international law of statehood
has developed gradually and alongside its human rights jurisprudence. The
ECtHR’s jurisprudence of statehood spans therefore over more than twenty
years, and even more if one refers to the time prior to the compulsory juris-
diction of the Court within the ECHR system.
What characterises the ECtHR’s jurisprudence of statehood has been its
conceptualisation of what one may refer to as the ‘democratic’ State. The
Court has indeed interpreted the States Parties’ human rights duties under
the ECHR as requiring the establishment of a democratic regime.58
Of course, democracy is protected by the ECHR in at least three diﬀerent
ways: as an aim in the Preamble; as speciﬁc democratic rights protected by the
Convention and its Protocols (article 10 and 11 ECHR); and as the ‘necessity
in a democratic society’ condition weighing on the justiﬁcation of domestic
restrictions of ECHR rights (eg, article 9(2) ECHR). As I will argue, the
Court’s case-law has gone one step further, however, and speciﬁed a
general positive duty for each State Party to be organised democratically.
Along the road, and as we will see below, this has been interpreted further
as encompassing various principles such as the separation of powers,59 judi-
cial independence, judicial review, political parties, free elections and political
pluralism. The ECtHR has also drawn other implications from this demo-
cratic requirement of the ECHR for its States Parties’ political organisation.
Those further requirements include in particular setting various limits on
consociationalism, federalism or other forms of decentralisation to protect
the individual equality of rights among ECHR right-holders in a given politi-
cal community,60 including when those forms of organisation are pro-
pounded by minority-based political parties.61
58 ECtHR, Ždanoka v Latvia App no 58278/00 (16 March 2006), paras 98ﬀ; ECtHR, Refah Partisi (the Welfare
Party) and Others v Turkey App nos 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98 and 41344/98 (13 February 2003),
paras 86–9; ECtHR, United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v Turkey App no 19392/92 (30
January 1998), paras 24ﬀ; ECtHR, Christian Democratic People’s Party v Moldova App no 28793/02 (14
May 2006), paras 62–70; ECtHR, Tănase v Moldova App no 7/08 (27 April 2010), paras 154 ﬀ; ECtHR,
Party for a Democratic Society (DTP) and Others v. Turkey App nos 3840/10, 3878/10, 15616/10,
21919/10, 39118/10 and 37272/10 (6 June 2016), paras 72–82; ECtHR, Şahin Alpay v Turkey App no
16538/17 (20 March 2018), para 180; ECtHR, Navalnyy v Russia App 29580/12 (15 November 2018),
para 175.
59 ECtHR, Animal Defenders International V UK App no 48876/08 (22 April 2013).
60 ECtHR Case‘relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium’ v
Belgium App nos 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, 2126/64 (23 July 1968), para 10;
ECtHR, Mathieu-Mohin and Clerfayt App no 9267/81 (2 March 1987), paras 46ﬀ; ECtHR, Sejdić and
Finci v Bosnia and Herzegovina, App nos 27996/06 and 34836/06 (22 December 2009), paras 42ﬀ.
61 ECtHR, Herri Batasuna and Batasuna v Spain, App nos 25803/04 and 25817/04 (30 June 2009), paras 74ﬀ;
ECtHR, Partidul Comunistilor (Nepeceristi) and Ungureanu v Romania App no 46626/99 (3 February 2005),
paras 46ﬀ; ECtHR, Yazar and Others v Turkey, App nos 22723/93, 22724/93 and 22725/93 (9 April 2002),
paras 40ﬀ; ECtHR, Refah Partisi (n 58) paras 86–9; ECtHR, Öcalan v Turkey App no 46221/99 (12 May
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Interestingly, in the wake of its jurisprudence on the democratic regime
and the internal organisation of States, the ECtHR has contributed to devel-
oping the international jurisprudence of statehood in general. With respect to
statehood itself, on the one hand, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence has recognised
the existence of a general positive institutional duty to be an eﬀective (demo-
cratic) State. Being an eﬀective State is indeed regarded by the Court as an
institutional condition for that State to then be able to respect, protect and
fulﬁl its human rights duties under the ECHR.62 According to the Court,
therefore, any State Party that has lost eﬀective jurisdiction (in the sense of
Article 1 ECHR) over its population and, by extension, over its oﬃcial terri-
tory has a positive duty to regain that control.63 It is through that general
institutional duty of States Parties to be eﬀective democratic States that the
Court has, in turn, come to mould various constitutive features of statehood
in a new and distinctive way.
The ECtHR has, ﬁrst of all, interpreted some of the international criteria of
statehood related to territoriality, including regarding border jurisdiction,64
maritime jurisdiction65 or extraterritorial spatial control as in the case of
occupation.66 It has also developed a jurisprudence on nationality, including
on statelessness and arbitrary denial or voluntary renunciation to national-
ity.67 Secondly, the Court has contributed to the interpretation of the begin-
ning and the end of statehood, by specifying States’ duties in the context of
succession68 and recognition.69 Regrettably, however, it has mostly remained
elusive on matters of self-determination and the right to secession under the
2005), paras 91–9; ECtHR, Süheyla Aydin v Turkey App no 25660/94 (24 May 2005), paras 164ﬀ and 200–
3. See Helen Keller and Corina Heri, ‘Minority and Secessionist Cases in the Case-Law of the European
Court of Human Rights’ in EM Belser et al. (eds), States Falling Apart? Secessionist and Autonomy Move-
ments in Europe (Stämpﬂi, 2015) 103–24, 108–11.
62 See ECtHR, Al-Skeini and Others v The United Kingdom App no 55721/07 (7 July 2011), paras 133ﬀ.
63 ECtHR, Loizidou v Turkey App no 15318/89 (18 December 1996), paras 49ﬀ; ECtHR, Cyprus v Turkey App
no 25781/94 (10 May 2001), paras 69ﬀ; ECtHR, Banković and other v Belgium and others App no 52207/
99 (12 December 2001), paras 55ﬀ; ECtHR, Ilaşcu and Others v Moldova and Russia App no 48787/99 (8
July 2004), paras 310ﬀ and 333ﬀ; ECtHR, Solomou and Others v Turkey App no 36832/97 (24 June 2008),
paras 43ﬀ; ECtHR, Azemi v Serbia App no 11209/09 (18 February 2009), paras 38–49; ECtHR, Issa v Turkey
App no 31821/96 (16 November 2011), paras 65ﬀ; ECtHR, Al-Skeini (n 63) paras 133ﬀ; ECtHR, Catan and
Others v Moldova and Russia, App nos 43370/04, 8252/05 and 18454/06 (19 October 2012), paras 145ﬀ;
ECtHR, Jaloud v the Netherlands App no 47708/08 (20 November 2014), paras 139ﬀ; ECtHR, Sargsyan v
Azerbaijan App no 40167/06 (16 June 2015), paras 126ﬀ; ECtHR, Chiragov and Others v Armenia App no
13216/05 (16 June 2015), paras 167ﬀ; ECtHR,Mozer v The Republic of Moldova and Russia App no 11138/
10 (23 February 2016), paras 96ﬀ; ECtHR, Tsezar and Others v Ukraine App no 73590/14, 73593/14,
73820/14, 4635/15, 5200/15, 5206/15, 7289/15 (13 February 2018), paras 73ﬀ.
64 ECtHR, N.D. and N.T. v Spain, App nos 8675/15 and 8697/15 (3 October 2017), paras 49ﬀ.
65 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy App no 27765/09 (23 February 2012), paras 70ﬀ; ECtHR,Medvedyev
and Others v France App no 3394/03 (29 March 2010), paras 62ﬀ.
66 ECtHR, Loizidou (n 63) paras 49ﬀ; ECtHR, Ilaşcu (n 63) paras 310ﬀ and 333ﬀ; ECtHR, Sargsyan v Azerbaijan
(n 63) paras 126ﬀ; ECtHR, Chiragov (n 63) paras 167ﬀ; ECtHR, Mozer (n 63) paras 96ﬀ.
67 ECtHR, Riener v Bulgaria App no 46343/99 (23 May 2006), paras 144ﬀ; ECtHR, Kurić and Others v Slovenia
App no 26828/06 (26 June 2012), paras 314ﬀ; ECtHR, Hoti v Croatia App no 63311/14 (26 April 2018),
paras 119ﬀ.
68 ECtHR, Bijelić v Montenegro and Serbia App no 11890/05 (28 April 2009), paras 67ﬀ; ECtHR, Ribać v Slo-
venia App no 57101/10 (5 December 2017), paras 61ﬀ; ECtHR, Andrejeva v Latvia App no 55707/00 (18
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ECHR by refusing to link one to the other.70 All the same, one may consider
that the ECtHR has indirectly conﬁrmed, when discussing State jurisdiction
and the related positive duties, that a State (in that case, Serbia) may lose
its duties to regain eﬀective control over a population and territory that
used to be its, when that population (in that case, Kosovo) has exercised
self-determination.71
Finally, the ECtHR has interpreted the content of some of the powers and
rights inherent in statehood, and in particular the scope of the authorised or
de jure extraterritorial jurisdiction of States72 or of their duties under the prin-
ciple of universal jurisdiction.73 The Court has also, famously, contributed to
identifying States’ human rights duties on grounds of the eﬀectiveness of the
exercise of powers that are ‘government’-like over another State’s territory
(what it refers to as ‘jurisdiction’ or ‘control’) even when that exercise of gov-
ernmental powers is illegal. It is the case in particular of States’ duties in cir-
cumstances of occupation.74 Generally, the ECtHR seems to be aware of the
slippery-slope danger posed by its recognition of such occurrences of extrater-
ritorial ‘territorial’ control. What it privileges as a ground for States’ extrater-
ritorial human rights duties therefore, where it can, is personal jurisdiction or
control.75 Indeed, this kind of quasi-statehood duties owed in the territory
and to the population of another State, even if the Court has recognised
them in order to generate States’ duties and not to grant them any rights, is
controversial: it comes very close to giving priority, in the name of human
rights protection, to quasi-governmental eﬀectivity over democratic legiti-
macy and hence to condoning forms of illegal long-term occupation provided
they respect human rights.76
On the other hand, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence of statehood has also con-
tributed to the second axis of the international law of statehood. First of all,
the Court has developed an extensive case-law on the human rights duties
of Member States of IOs with respect to the latter’s actions or omissions,
thereby moulding those States’ relations to IOs. It is the case with respect
February 2009), paras 74ﬀ; ECtHR, Government of the Republic of Slovenia v Republic of Croatia App no
54155/16 (pending).
69 ECtHR, Loizidou (n 63) paras 39ﬀ; ECtHR, Cyprus v Turkey (n 63) paras 82ﬀ; ECtHR, Demopoulos and
Others v Turkey App nos 46113/99, 3843/02, 13751/02, 13466/03, 10200/04, 14163/04, 19993/04,
and 21819/04 (1 March 2010), paras 72ﬀ.
70 ECtHR, Gorzelik and Others v Poland App no 44158/98 (17 February 2004), paras 48ﬀ.
71 ECtHR, Azemi (n 63) paras 38ﬀ.
72 ECtHR, Öcalan (n 61) paras 83ﬀ.
73 ECtHR, Naït-Liman v Switzerland App no 51357/07 (5 March 2018), paras 173ﬀ.
74 ECtHR, Loizidou (n 63) paras 49–57; ECtHR, Ilaşcu (n 63) paras 310ﬀ and 333ﬀ; ECtHR, Chiragov (n 63)
paras 167ﬀ; ECtHR, Mozer (n 63) paras 96ﬀ.
75 ECtHR, Al-Skeini (n 63) paras 133ﬀ; ECtHR, Jaloud (n 63) paras 139ﬀ; ECtHR, Hassan v the United Kingdom
App no 29750/09 (16 September 2014), paras 74ﬀ.
76 See Samantha Besson, ‘The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights. Why
Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What Jurisdiction Amounts to’ (2012) 25(4) Leiden Journal
of International Law 857.
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to States’ duties to ensure equivalence in the human rights protection oﬀered
under IO law,77 but also, in the context of the assessment of their concurrent
responsibility, of the potentially joint attribution of IO conduct to States in
case of eﬀective control.78
Secondly, the ECtHR’s jurisprudence of statehood has also contributed to
the delineation between States and private actors. Indeed, the Court has long
innovated in the ﬁeld of States’ positive duties to protect against private
actors.79 It has thereby prevented States from hiding behind the public/
private distinction to escape their human rights duties to protect. It has
also furthered that distinction, however, by developing case-law on the attri-
bution of conduct of certain private actors to States for purposes of ECHR
responsibility80 and on the immunities of States for their agents.81 With
respect to attribution, however, one should emphasise that the ECtHR has
mostly used States’ positive duties to protect against private actors in order
to condemn States in those case, without concern for the details of the
grounds of attribution of those private actors’ actions or omissions to the
State.82 In a distinct line of jurisprudence, the ECtHR has also clearly favoured
the protection of civil society against, but also by the State: it has done so
through the protection of the human rights of political parties,83 but also of
NGOs,84 and, as of late and in a much criticised line of cases, of
corporations.85
Although the ECtHR refers and, sometimes, even defers to the ICJ on
matters of general rules of international law of statehood, it has also developed
its own interpretations on many them. As a result, the ECtHR’s international
jurisprudence of ‘democratic’ statehood may not always be compatible with
the ICJ’s. This may be explained by its post-SecondWorld War and especially
post-Cold War emphasis on the internal organisation of statehood, and
especially on the rights of the population underpinning State sovereignty.
77 ECtHR,Waite and Kennedy v Germany App no 26083/94 (18 February 1999), paras 66ﬀ; ECtHR, Bosphorus
Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v Ireland App no 45036/98 (30 June 2005), paras 149ﬀ;
ECtHR, Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v Switzerland App no 5809/08 (21 June 2016, Grand
Chamber), paras 102ﬀ; ECtHR, Al-Dulimi and Montana Management Inc. v Switzerland App no 5809/
08 (26 November 2013, Chamber).
78 ECtHR, Al-Jedda v The United Kingdom App no 27021/08 (7 July 2011), paras 74ﬀ.
79 ECtHR, Osman v the United Kingdom App no 23452/94 (28 October 1998), paras 113ﬀ; ECtHR, O’Keeﬀe v
Ireland App no 35810/09 (28 January 2014), paras 143ﬀ; ECtHR, Kelly and Others v the United Kingdom
App no 30054/96 (4 May 2001), paras 91ﬀ.
80 ECtHR, Ilaşcu (n 63) paras 310ﬀ; ECtHR, Jaloud (n 63) paras 137ﬀ.
81 ECtHR, Fogarty v the United Kingdom App no 37112/97 (21 November 2001), paras 22ﬀ; ECtHR, Al-Adsani
v the United Kingdom App no 35763/97 (21 November 2001), 35ﬀ; ECtHR, Jones and Others v the United
Kingdom, App nos 34356/06 and 40528/06 (14 January 2014), paras 199ﬀ.
82 ECtHR, Costello-Roberts v the United Kingdom App no 13134/87 (25 March 1993), paras 25ﬀ.
83 ECtHR, Refah Partisi (n 58); ECtHR, Yumak and Sadak v Turkey App no 10226/03 (8 July 2008).
84 ECtHR, Centre for Legal Resources on behalf of Valentin Câmpeanu v Romania App no 47848/08 (17 July
2014).
85 ECtHR, Autronic AG v Switzerland App no 12726/87 (22 May 1990); ECtHR, OAO Neftyanaya Kompaniya
Yukos v Russia App no 14902/04 (20 September 2011); ECtHR, Slovenia v Croatia (n 68).
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Two examples help illustrating this. The ﬁrst one pertains to the (albeit very)
indirect endorsement of the collective right to self-determination,86 and the
second one to the indirect and de facto acknowledgement of a right to nation-
ality under certain circumstances.87
3.2.3. The CJEU and the managerial State
The international law of statehood does not belong to the core of the CJEU’s
mandate to the extent that EU law does not directly regulate statehood. All the
same, and to the extent that general international law applies to the EU and to
EU Member States,88 the Court has developed a jurisprudence of statehood
ever since the late 1950s. Its jurisprudence of statehood therefore spans
over more than sixty years.
What characterises the CJEU’s jurisprudence of statehood has been the
construction of what one may refer to as the ‘managerial’ (Member)89
State. It is a well-established critique of the CJEU indeed that it has contrib-
uted to (over)constitutionalising the market in EU law. It has done so by
developing the principle of the primacy of EU law, including of EU internal
market law, over domestic constitutional law and by therefore placing econ-
omic requirements at the same constitutional level as respect for the rule of
law, democracy or fundamental rights under EU law.90
More speciﬁcally, the CJEU has gradually interpreted EU law as requiring
the EU and its EU Member States to adopt a certain external and internal
organisation, an organisation that favours the internal market over (certain
selected) public interests. To that extent, the internal political organisation
of the EU, and especially its division of powers between the EU and its
Member States, as they result from the CJEU’s jurisprudence, may be said
to correspond perfectly to the neo-liberal blueprint. One of the institutional
features of neo-liberalism is indeed what one refers to as a ‘market-preserving
federalism’ or decentralisation.91 On that approach, (regional) economic gov-
ernance should be separated from (domestic) politics, and the State should be
turned into a manager of the economic policy adopted at the (regional) inter-
national level. As a matter of fact, the CJEU has also favoured another kind of
market-preserving decentralisation, albeit within Member States this time,
that is instrumental to the internal market. It has encouraged, provided
86 ECtHR, Azemi (n 63) paras 38ﬀ.
87 ECtHR, Hoti (n 67) paras 119ﬀ.
88 CJEU, C-162/96 Racke (16 June 1998), paras 45ﬀ; T, Case T-115/94 Opel Austria v Council (22 January
1997), paras 89ﬀ; CJEU, C-386/08 Brita (25 February 2010), paras 37ﬀ.
89 See Christopher Bickerton, ‘From Nation State to Member State. Trajectories of State Reconﬁguration
and Recomposition in Europe’ in P Le Gales et D King (eds), Reconﬁguring European States in Crisis
(Oxford University Press, 2017) 45–71.
90 See Dieter Grimm, ‘The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalization: The European Case’ (2015) 21(4) Euro-
pean Law Journal 460.
91 See Adam Harmes, ‘New Constitutionalism and Multilevel Governance’ in S Gill and AC Cutler (eds), New
Constitutionalism and World Order (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 143–58.
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they are in the interest of the internal market, forms of federalism, devolution
or decentralisation within States’ internal political organisation,92 on the one
hand, and of privatisation of public services and ‘functions’ in that context, on
the other. This has turned EU Member States into another kind of managers
or ‘orchestrators’:93 not so much managers for the EU this time, but for the
market activities of local public actors and private actors within their
jurisdiction.
Of course, the CJEU’s jurisprudence on managerial statehood has devel-
oped together with, and actually mirrors its jurisprudence pertaining to the
EU itself. What characterises the EU indeed is the ‘integration’ of its
Member States and their legal orders into a regional institution and legal
order. When pressed to explain what integration amounts to, the Court has
repeated that the EU is a sui generis entity that arose out of international
law, but now amounts to a legal order of a new kind, neither domestic nor
international.94 Recently, the Court conﬁrmed that the EU is not a State.95
This has serious implications for all internal aspects of statehood that are
shared by the EU and its Member States, and in particular for EU and dom-
estic citizenship, democracy or rule of law. They have indeed been detached
from what makes the legitimacy of the State and its laws, ie, its people, and
have become free-ﬂoating conditions of political legitimacy tout court. Of
course, some characteristics of statehood have not (yet) come within the
(legal) reach of the EU, and that is the case of sovereignty or jurisdiction.
However, they have been pooled between EU Member States and simply go
by other names when the EU exercises them such as ‘competences’ or
‘powers’. The same applies to the criteria of statehood in international law,
like territory, nationality, eﬀective government or independence that are
replaced, when the EU is at stake, by terms like ‘space’, ‘citizenship’, ‘govern-
ance’ or ‘autonomy’. Increasingly, then, those new terms are shared inter-
changeably by both the EU and its Member States, thereby aﬀecting the
legal identity of EU Member States.
In the wake of its jurisprudence on the external and internal organisation
of EU Member States as managerial States, the CJEU has also contributed to
developing the international jurisprudence of statehood in general. With
respect to statehood itself, on the one hand, the CJEU’s jurisprudence on
the interpretation and implementation of EU law pertains to all dimensions
identiﬁed earlier in this section. First of all, the CJEU has revisited the consti-
tutive criteria of statehood. It has been the case for territory, in particular, as
92 CJEU, C-428/07 Horvath (16 July 2009).
93 See Patrick Le Gales and Desmond King, ‘Introduction. A Reconﬁgured State? European Policy States in a
Globalizing World’ in P Le Gales and D King (eds), Reconﬁguring European States in Crisis (Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2017) 1–42.
94 CJEU, C-26/62 Van Gend & Loos (12 December 1962), p 12; CJEU, Opinion 1/91 (14 December 1991),
paras 21ﬀ; CJEU, Opinion 2/13 (18 December 2014), paras 153ﬀ.
95 CJEU, Opinion 2/13 (n 94), paras 153ﬀ.
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the CJEU has ventured into issues of border delimitations at sea,96 of border
control on the ground97 and of overseas territories.98 The CJEU has also inter-
preted the notion of State nationality extensively in the context of its
interpretation of EU citizenship because the latter derives from State nation-
ality.99 It has in particular drawn a distinction in quality between the equal
citizenship rights of other EU Member State nationals and the rights of
third country nationals in a given EU Member State.100 The CJEU has
further qualiﬁed the international law regime of State nationality itself by
adding conditions to fulﬁl in case of loss of EU Member State nationality
(and hence of EU citizenship) based on domestic law.101 It has also
speciﬁed some of the rights derived from State nationality, with respect to
an EU citizen’s name for instance102 or to the minimal right not to leave
the EU.103 Another feature of the CJEU’s jurisprudence pertaining to EU citi-
zenship qua economic citizenship has been to require EU Member States to
diﬀerentiate between economically and non-economically active nationals
of other EU Member States to the extent that EU citizenship rights are
reserved to the former.104 States have also been requested to distinguish
between third country nationals and EU Member State nationals on
grounds of nationality without that ground being considered discriminatory
under EU law.105
Secondly, the CJEU has also contributed to the interpretation of the begin-
ning and the end of statehood, by specifying States’ duties in the context of
State succession106 and recognition.107 The Court has even emphasised the
erga omnes nature of the right to self-determination and the related State
duty of non-recognition that a violation of that right generates for other
States including EU Member States and the EU itself, although it did not
have to resort to those arguments to settle the cases in the end.108 Thirdly,
96 CJEU, C-146/89 Commission v United Kingdom and Northern Ireland (9 July 1991).
97 CJEU, C-606/10 ANAFE (14 June 2012), paras 23–9; CJEU, C-278/12 PPU Atiqullah Adil (19 July 2012),
paras 48–58.
98 CJEU, C-591/15 The Gibraltar Betting and Gaming Association (13 June 2017), paras 26ﬀ; CJEU, C-300/04
Eman and Sevinger (12 September 2006), paras 20ﬀ.
99 CJEU, C-369/90Micheletti (7 July 1992), paras 11ﬀ; CJEU, C-192/99 Kaur (20 February 2001), paras 19–27.
100 CJEU, C-145/04 Spain v United Kingdom (12 September 2006), paras 72–80.
101 CJEU, C-135/08 Rottmann (2 March 2010).
102 CJEU, C-168/91 Konstantinidis (30 March 1993); CJEU, C-353/06 Grunkin and Paul (14 October 2008).
103 CJEU, C-34/09 Ruiz Zambrano (8 March 2011); CJEU, C-165/14 Rendón Marín (13 September 2016);
CJEU, C- 133/15 Chavez-Vilchez e.a. (10 May 2017).
104 CJEU, C-184/99 Grzelczyk (20 September 2001), paras 29ﬀ; CJEU, C-224/98 D’Hoop (11 July 2002), paras
27ﬀ; CJEU, C-85/96 Martínez Sala (12 May 1998), paras 29ﬀ; CJEU, C-209/03 Bidar (15 March 2005),
paras 28ﬀ; CJEU, C-158/07 Förster (18 November), paras 25ﬀ; CJEU, C-73/08 Bressol and Others (13
April 2010), paras 40ﬀ.
105 CJEU, C-22/08 Vatsouras (4 June 2009); CJEU, C-291/09 Francesco Guarnieri & Cie (7 April 2011); T, T-
618/15 Voigt v Parliament (20 November 2017).
106 CJEU, C-216/01 Budvar (18 November 2003).
107 CJEU, C-50/90 Sunzest v Commission (13 June 1991); CJEU, C-432/92 Anastasiou (5 July 1994).
108 CJEU, C-104/16 P Front Polisario (21 December 2016), paras 86–108; CJEU, C-266/16 Western Sahara
Campaign UK (27 February 2018, grand Chamber), paras 61–9.
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the CJEU has interpreted the content of some of the powers and rights of sta-
tehood, and in particular the scope of territorial jurisdiction109 or protective
jurisdiction including its extraterritorial consequences.110 The CJEU has
further ventured into interpreting State immunities.111
Finally, the CJEU has also been concerned with EU Member States’
internal organisation. It has been the case with respect to their political
regime in particular. In that context, the Court has interpreted EU law as
requiring from States that they endorse principles such as the separation of
powers, the rule of law, parliamentary democracy,112 fundamental rights,113
judicial independence,114 judicial review,115 or transparency/access to
documents.116
On the other hand, the CJEU’s jurisprudence of statehood has also contrib-
uted to developing issues in the second axis of the international law of state-
hood. First of all, the Court has developed an extensive case-law on the EU’s
internal relations to its Member States, but also on its external relations to
other States and other IOs. A telling example of the CJEU’s jurisprudence
in this respect is its interpretation of the international responsibility of the
EU in case of breach of international law by an EU Member State acting
within the scope of EU exclusive or shared competences.117 In this context,
EU Member States are not approached as ‘organs’ of the EU in the sense in
which a State organ may be placed at the disposal of an IO (article 7 Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations 2011118), but
they are regarded as domestic managers of EU law matters and responsibility
should therefore be borne exclusively by the EU. The CJEU has also famously
considered that EU constitutional law could take priority over EU law imple-
menting UN Security Council resolutions, with the same consequences for EU
Member States, including permanent members of the Security Council.119 All
the same, there have also been cases in which the CJEU has been reluctant to
109 CJEU, C-420/07 Apostolides (28 April 2009), paras 47–71.
110 CJEU, C-424/13 Zuchtvieh-Export (23 April 2015), paras 34ﬀ; CJEU, C-592/14 European Federation for
Cosmetic Ingredients (21 September 2016), paras 28ﬀ; CJEU, C-230/14 Weltimmo (1 October 2015),
paras 19ﬀ; CJEU, C-591/15 Gibraltar Betting (n 98) paras 26 ﬀ.
111 CJEU, C-179/13 Evans (15 January 2015); CJEU, C-154/11 Mahamdia (19 July 2012).
112 CJEU, C-441/05 Roquette Frères (8 March 2007); CJEU, C-190/84 Les Verts v Parliament (25 February
1988); T, T-365/04 Cantoni v Council and Commission (18 December 2009); T, T-754/14 Eﬂer v Commis-
sion (10 May 2017); CJEU, C-589/15 P Anagnostakis v Commission (12 September 2017), paras 23–4.
113 CJEU, C-29/69 Stauder (12 November 1969); CJEU, C-4/73 Nold v Commission (14 May 1974; CJEU, C-36/
75 Rutili (28 October 1975).
114 CJEU, C-64/16 Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (27 February 2018); CJEU, C-216/18 PPU LM
(25 July 2018).
115 CJEU, C-432/05 Unibet (13 March 2007); CJEU, C-188/10 and C-189/10 Aziz Melki and Sélim Abdeli (22
June 2010).
116 CJEU, C-280/11 P Council v Access Info Europe (17 October 2013).
117 CJEU, C-213/03 Pêcheurs de l’Etang de Berre (15 July 2014).
118 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations’ (2011) II(2) Yearbook of the Inter-
national Law Commission 40.
119 CJEU, C-402/05 P Kadi v Council and Commission (3 September 2008).
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meddle with EU Member States’ international relations and their inter-
national law regime. It has been the case with respect to the international
law of diplomatic relations in particular.120
Secondly, the CJEU’s jurisprudence of statehood has also contributed to
the delineation between States and private actors. This has been of prime
importance for the eﬀectivity of the EU’s internal market law. Thus, the
CJEU has identiﬁed criteria to distinguish State institutions from private
undertakings in the areas of State aids, golden shares and competition law.
So-doing, the Court aimed at unmasking both cases where the State is pre-
tending to be a private actor and cases where the State is camouﬂaging
private actors as public ones.121 Interestingly, instead of deﬁning the private
sector, and its actors, negatively by reference to the State, as has been done
in State political theory and public law since the eighteenth Century, the
CJEU has reversed the direction of the distinction: it relies on the market
and free competition in those cases as a negative functional criterion for
the identiﬁcation of public actors.122
Although the CJEU refers, and sometimes even defers to the ICJ on matters
of general rules of international law of statehood, it has also developed its own
interpretations on many of them. This may be explained by its emphasis on
the external and internal organisation of what one may call ‘market state-
hood’, and especially on the priority of the market and the protection of
private actors. Two examples conﬁrm this: one from the ﬁeld of EU citizen-
ship jurisprudence, and its discriminatory implications for the acquisition
and loss of EU Member State nationality,123 and the other from the ﬁeld of
EU trade policy, and the loosening of the conditions of State recognition.124
4. Criticising and reforming the international jurisprudence of
statehood
4.1. Three critiques of the international jurisprudence of statehood
Three critiques of the international jurisprudence of statehood just presented
need addressing in particular: its imperialism; its techno-scientiﬁcity; and its
de-politicisation.
120 CJEU, C-364/10 Hungary v Slovakia (16 October 2012); CJEU, C-466/11 Currà e.a. (12 July 2012).
121 CJEU, C-355/01 AOK-Bundesverband and Others (16 March 2014), paras 45ﬀ; CJEU, C-41/90 Höfner and
Elser (23 April 1991); CJEU, C-222/04 Cassa di Risparmio di Firenze C-222/04 (10 January 2006),
paras107ﬀ; CJEU, C-35/99 Arduino (19 February 2002), paras 32–44. See Miguel Poiares Maduro,
‘The Chameleon State: EU Law and the Blurring of the Private/Public Distinction in the Market’ in N
Rainer (ed), Conﬂict of Laws and Laws of Conﬂict in Europe and Beyond: Patterns of Supranational
and Transnational Juridiﬁcation (Intersentia, 2010) 279–92.
122 CJEU, C-136/86 Aubert (3 December 1987); CJEU, Commission v Italy C-251/17 (31 May 2018); CJEU,
Arduino (n 121) paras 32–44.
123 CJEU, Vatsouras (n 105) paras 33–53; CJEU, Guarnieri (n 105) paras 11–21; T, Voigt (n 105) paras 74–81.
124 CJEU, Sunzest (n 107); CJEU, Anastasiou (n 107).
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The ﬁrst critique pertains to the imperialism of the international jurispru-
dence of statehood.125 It emphasises how ICs, and the PCIJ and ICJ in particu-
lar, have identiﬁed European and then Western criteria of statehood and
various principles pertaining not only to the beginning and the end of state-
hood, but also to States’ rights and duties and, later on, to their internal organ-
isation, and turned them into international law. Whether this has been done
by mere judicial law-making independently from customary law in the area,
on the one hand, or by the transformation of what was already a regional
custom in Europe and the West into a universal one, on the other, the critique
bites equally.
Of course, as I explained before, statehood has now been successfully uni-
versalised by international law and the jurisprudence of ICs, at least formally.
The consequences of its imperialistic internationalisation are still being felt in
most places, however. In many regions outside the West, indeed, States have
remained empty shells, ghost presences hiding a political void or inhabited by
other political or communal forms, religious or not, that have not accommo-
dated to the parallel State structure, thereby leading to tensions and instabil-
ity.126 It is surprising therefore that contemporary interpretations by ICs do
not refer more than original ones to the current domestic practices of state-
hood outside of the West, in particular in order to make the new international
jurisprudence of statehood more inclusive. This would seem to be even more
required as the internationalisation of statehood through ICs carries on, but
this time with respect to new aspects of the international law of statehood.
It has been the case for those originally Western norms pertaining to the
internal organisation of States, and in particular those related to their demo-
cratic regime and political organisation (eg, political parties), but also to the
private/public divide (eg, civil society, NGOs) and States’ relations to
private actors.
This critique does not only apply to the ICJ’s jurisprudence of statehood,
but also to the ECtHR’s where variations in the political and legal conceptions
of statehood within Europe have never been seriously considered and alterna-
tive conceptions are usually disparaged as plainly abusive. If we want to over-
come human rights formalism in Turkey or Russia and reach behind the
façade of pseudo-democratic statehood and the false pretence of those and
other Council of Europe States regarding the eﬀective protection of human
rights in practice, we need to take alternative domestic forms of political
organisation or, at least, diﬀerent domestic contextualisations of various
125 See eg, Rosalyn Higgins, ‘The International Court of Justice and Africa’ in R Higgins (ed), Themes and
Theories: Selected Essays, Speeches, and Writings in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2009)
1056–71; Sundhya Pahuja, ‘Laws of Encounter: A Jurisdictional Account of International Law’ (2013)
1 London Review of International Law 63; Luis Eslava and Sundhya Pahuja, ‘The Nation-State and Inter-
national Law: A Reading from the Global South’ (2019) 10 Humanity: An International Journal of Human
Rights, Humanitarianism and Development (forthcoming).
126 See also Badie (n 12).
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aspects of statehood more seriously. The same should be said about the CJEU
and the way it has dealt so far with certain aspects of the internal organisation
of statehood in Hungary or Poland by simply transposing Western or North-
ern conceptions of the State onto States in the East or South of Europe.127
The second, and related, critique of the international jurisprudence of sta-
tehood pertains to its techno-scientiﬁcity.128 What is at stake here is the ten-
dency of the international jurisprudence of statehood to contribute to the
diﬀusion of a set of objective techno-scientiﬁc standards of statehood,
usually of an economic kind, that are beyond justiﬁcation or normative cri-
tique. Unlike legal principles or rules, those standards are not there to hold
State authority accountable to people subjected to State laws and justify it,
but merely to assert and then verify its authority over them. This is what
some authors like Bhuta have referred to as ‘State-science’.129
Thus, one may cite the standards, and their indicator-based measures, of
‘developmental statehood’, and more recently of ‘entrepreneurial state-
hood’.130 The most recent case of the former model of statehood is, of
course, the one encapsulated in the 2015 Sustainable Development Goals
and their many targets and indicators (UN General Assembly Resolution
70/1). A jurisprudential example to point to with respect to the latter is the
CJEU’s implicit reversing of the direction of one of the oldest and most fun-
damental distinctions in the Western legal tradition, ie, the distinction
between the public and the private. The Court draws indeed on the market
in order to identify what should be the ‘functions’ of public authorities
rather than the other way around.131 The CJEU has also contributed to impos-
ing a Northern conception of the ‘entrepreneurial State’ as part of the austerity
regimes on Southern EU Member States.132
A third, and related, critique of the international jurisprudence of state-
hood focuses on its de-politicisation.133 It pertains to the growing disconnec-
tion therein between the State and the population whose political community
the State personiﬁes as a legal ﬁction and, by extension, to the comparability
and even assimilation between States’ governmentality and any form of ‘gov-
ernance’ including economic governance.
127 CJEU, Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses (n 114) paras 27–52; CJEU, LM (n 114).
128 See eg, Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law’ (n 5).
129 See Nehal Bhuta, ‘State Theory, State Order, State System – Jus Gentium and the Constitution of Public
Power’ in S Kadelbach, T Kleinlein and D Roth-Isigkeit (eds), System, Order and International Law: The
Early History of International Legal Thought from Machiavelli to Hegel (Oxford University Press, 2017)
398–417.
130 See Eslava/Pahuja (n 125).
131 CJEU, Aubert (n 122); CJEU, Commission v Italy (n 122); CJEU, Arduino (n 121).
132 CJEU, C-128/12 Sindicato dos Bancários do Norte and Others (7 March 2013).
133 See Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Future of Statehood’ (1991) 32 Harvard International Law Journal 397;
Martti Koskenniemi, ‘The Wonderful Artiﬁciality of States’ (1994) 88 Proceedings of the ASIL Annual
Meeting 22.
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Of course, it is easy to understand when, in the history of statehood, that con-
nection was lost, both in practice and theory. Shortly after the nineteenth Cen-
tury’s liberal anthropomorphism and the assimilation of States to real or natural
persons, utilitarian political thinkers rejected all legal ﬁctions including that of
the State and its personiﬁcation as a legal person. They reduced each State to
its government and State law’s authority to coercion, thereby evacuating the pol-
itical dimension of statehood and losing sight of the representation relationship
between the State (personifying the political community) and its government.134
The international law of statehood of the early twentieth Century clearly
reﬂected this utilitarian conception of statehood. That trend was even reinforced
with the development of IOs whose driving justiﬁcation was and, to a large
extent, still is functionalist. That instrumental conception of authority was
then re-imposed onto (Member) States through IO law. This is well exempliﬁed
by the CJEU’s turning EU Member States into managerial States.
True, in the meantime, the connection between the State and its population
has clearly been re-emphasised in other parts of international law that emerged
after the second World War and were reinforced at the end of the Cold War,
and in international human rights law in particular. The internal dimension
of the international law of statehood, and especially its part pertaining to
States’ democratic regime are there to remind us thereof. One may understand
therefore that the early international jurisprudence of statehood, and especially
the ICJ’s, placed priority on other criteria of statehood than the population and
personal jurisdiction, giving priority most of the time to territory (or eﬀective
government over a territory) when deciding whether a ‘non-self-governing
entity’ was a State.135 The fact that that conception has been resilient through-
out the twentieth Century and to this date, however, is problematic. It suﬃces in
this respect to consider the ICJ’s recent opinions and their neglect of the
popular and political dimension of the right to self-determination.136 Of
course, there are signs of dissidence on the part of some ICs, and especially
of the ECtHR,137 but they have been very slow and cautious so far.
4.2. Three reform proposals for the international jurisprudence of
statehood
Some authors criticise the current state of the international law of statehood
without making any proposals for reform138 or, worse, consider that any
134 See Quentin Skinner, ‘The Sovereign State: A Genealogy’, in Q Skinner and H Kalmo (eds), Sovereignty in
Fragments: The Past, Present, and Future of a Contested Concept (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 40–
44.
135 ICJ, Western Sahara (n 13) paras 79ﬀ.
136 ICJ, Kosovo (n 35) paras 79ﬀ; ICJ, Wall (n 46) paras 87ﬀ. See, however, ICJ, Chagos Archipelago (n 46)
para 160.
137 ECtHR, Azemi (n 63) paras 38–49.
138 See Pahuja (n 125); Eslava/Pahuja (n 125).
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attempts at ﬁxing things within international law are doomed to fail.139 Authors
who hold those positions underestimate the resources of law and of inter-
national law in particular. They are wrong, in particular, to assume that inter-
national law can only be imperialistic, anthropomorphic and legalistic, and that
international adjudication can only be of the liberal kind we know of inWestern
States. It may have been the case in the past, but those characteristics are no
more a curse in international law than they have been in the domestic legal
order. As a matter of fact, as I will argue, ICs are best placed within the
current institutional structure of international law-making, and due to their
unique qualities of judicial reasoning, to develop the kind of jurisprudence of
statehood we need to address international institutional challenges.
The promise of self-determination that came with equal statehood under
international law has been broken, not to mention the promise of economic
development that came later in its wake. The result has been, as we all
know, global instability and disorder. It is urgent therefore to make the
most of international law and its promise of universality and individual equal-
ity while it still binds. This implies making sure that the equality of States that
vouches, however imperfectly, for our individual equality across borders also
amounts to equality in the making of the future international law of state-
hood. However parochial its origins and imperfect its implementation, state-
hood is indeed what the diﬀerent peoples inhabiting the world now have in
common and what enables them to be ‘forming a world together’140 thanks
to international law.
4.2.1. Comparing the international law of statehood
A ﬁrst way to reform the international jurisprudence of statehood so as to
make it more universal in content, and thereby address the critique of imperi-
alism, would be to include, compare and distinguish conceptions of the State,
from diﬀerent parts either of the world at the ICJ or of the European region at
the ECtHR or CJEU.
Of course, as most State theorists know, there could be as many con-
ceptions of statehood as there are States. Commonalities can surely be
sought for and found, however, without perpetuating the imposition of the
Western liberal conception of statehood on other States in the world or of
Western or Northern conceptions on Eastern and Southern States in
Europe. There is a path, albeit a narrow one, between imperialism and
sheer relativism, and hence between unicity and radical diﬀerence.
One way to make the international jurisprudence of statehood more uni-
versal is to resort to an important albeit currently neglected resource in
139 See d’Aspremont, ‘The International Law of Statehood’ (n 9); d’Aspremont, ‘Statehood and Recog-
nition’ (n 9).
140 Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (Penguin, 1963) 175.
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international law-making: comparative international law. Its point is to
compare how a given rule, principle or institution of international law is inter-
preted and practiced in domestic law (this is what one may refer to as ‘com-
parative international domestic law’), but also how it is interpreted in diﬀerent
regimes and by diﬀerent ICs (‘comparative international law’ sricto sensu).
The latter corresponds to what has been done, albeit on a more modest
scale, in this article and should contribute to bringing not only more
nuance and dialogue, but also more coherence in the fragmented international
jurisprudence of statehood. The former may imply resorting to the compari-
son of domestic jurisprudences of statehood. Developing such a comparative
jurisprudence of statehood is even more important as domestic courts are
often the ones enforcing and hence interpreting and developing the inter-
national law of statehood. It is the case, for instance, in areas of the inter-
national law of statehood such as immunities, recognition or succession.141
Given the diversity of theories and practices of statehood across States, the
best place to start is probably through regional comparisons of the domestic
jurisprudence of statehood.142
By comparison to other international institutions and especially other IOs’
organs, ICs are actually well placed in terms of the kind and quality of their
reasoning to launch such comparative discussions of statehood in their juris-
prudence. ICs are, ﬁrst of all, routinely confronted with issues of statehood
stemming from all States around the world. Practically, therefore, they are
in possession of legal material that may enable them to conduct a comparative
law study in each case. It is, of course, especially the case of the ICJ, but
regional courts like the ECtHR and the CJEU present the same features at
the regional level. Secondly, ICs are usually composed of judges that should
be representative of legal and political cultures, either of the world for the
ICJ or within the region for regional ICs. This can contribute to enhance
their epistemic ability to conduct the required comparative studies, with
others or ‘single-judgedly’.143 Finally, the authority of ICs’ jurisprudence of
statehood is broad, whether on the universal plane for the ICJ or on a regional
one for the ECtHR or the CJEU, and this is essential in an area of general
international law that aﬀects all States like the international law of statehood.
This feature explained why the ICJ remained attractive to States as an inter-
national law-maker even when theWestern bias of its conception of statehood
141 See Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Dynamics of Statehood in the Practice of International and English
Courts’ in C Chinkin and F Baetens (eds), Sovereignty, Statehood and State Responsibility: Essays in
Honour of James Crawford (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 172–91.
142 See Samantha Besson, ‘The Inﬂuence of the Two Covenants on States Parties across Regions – Lessons
for the Role of Comparative Law and Regions in International Human Rights Law’ in D Moeckli, H Keller
and C Heri (eds), The Human Rights Covenants at 50. Their Past, Present and Future (Oxford University
Press, 2018) 243–76.
143 See eg, Judges Ammoun, Forster, and Boni, Separate Opinions, ICJ,Western Sahara (n 13) 83ﬀ, 103, and
173f.
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was clear to non-Western States.144 The broader the claimed authority of an
IC, however, the more important it is to its justiﬁcation, and hence to its legiti-
macy, that its reasoning be comparative and that it take all States Parties’ con-
ceptions seriously.145
Interestingly, some ICs already practice comparative domestic and inter-
national law in their standard judicial reasoning. It would not therefore
take too much work to extend comparative reasoning to their respective jur-
isprudence of statehood. It is the case of the ECtHR’s whose subsidiary review
has led it to ﬁrst identify a European consensus among States Parties on the
issue at stake and then to modulate its own degree of review by reference to
that consensus. The same may be said of the CJEU even if recent years have
seen less comparative law in the reasoning of the Court, including in the areas
where it is most needed like EU fundamental rights or other issues related to
EU Member States’ constitutional identity.
4.2.2. Justifying the international law of statehood
A way to reform the international jurisprudence of statehood so as to make it
less technical in content, and thereby address the critique of its lack of norma-
tivity, would be to enhance the quality of ICs’ reasoning.
Improving the normative quality of international judicial reasoning per-
taining to statehood should in principle be within reach. International
judges, like domestic judges, have the capacity to be true moral reasoners
and, arguably, also have the responsibility to reason in such a way as well.
Unlike international law-making in other organs of an IO or in treaty confer-
ences, international judicial law-making knows only of constraints related to
reasoning. To the extent that those constraints are respected, therefore, one
may hope for contestation of the functionalist and instrumental regulation
of statehood adopted by other organs of the IO. Moreover, international
judges are or, at least, should be selected among the best international
lawyers in their respective countries or regions. Their domestic training
should enable them not only to contribute eﬀectively to the comparative sta-
tehood exercise discussed before, but also vest them with the relevant dom-
estic legal knowledge and experience to enhance the quality of international
judicial reasoning on statehood. Finally, the plurality of ICs, and their ten-
dency to refer to one another and especially to the ICJ in their jurisprudence
of statehood, may even be a virtue in this context as it can help launch an open
comparative and theoretical dialogue between courts.
More speciﬁcally, the international jurisprudence of statehood could be
reformed so as to reveal more openly what underpinning political and legal
144 See Ibrahim Shihata, ‘The Attitude of New States Towards the International Court of Justice’ (1965) 19
International Organizations 203.
145 See Besson (n 142).
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theories of statehood are being discussed and used in the justiﬁcation of the
interpretations of the international law of statehood selected in each case.
When one knows how many controversies in political and legal theory
there have been around statehood, it is diﬃcult to imagine judges could
avoid entering into some of them in their judgments and having to develop
the clear conception of the structure and justiﬁcation of the international
legal order that necessarily goes with them. A comparative discussion of dom-
estic jurisprudences actually also implies a readiness to compare and dis-
tinguish the variety of (eg, Hobbesian, Jellinekian or Weberian146) theories
of the State underpinning those legal regimes.
4.2.3. Politicising the international law of statehood
A third proposal to reform the international jurisprudence of statehood so as
to make it more political in content, and thereby address the critique of their
lack of reference to representation, would be to re-situate the people or pol-
itical community the State personiﬁes at the core of the international law of
statehood.
Fitting in the political community and its personiﬁcation by the State into
the jurisprudence of statehood requires, for instance, that ICs openly confront
issues of self-determination, but also of State succession. It also means linking
territoriality to the population and personal jurisdiction over that population
situated in a given territory when assessing statehood rather than conceiving
of territorial jurisdiction independently of that population and its politics. ICs
should also conceive of States’ relations to other institutions, public or private,
as political relations rather than as relations of governance. After all, the early
ICJ’s case-law did refer to the UN, and other IOs, as ‘bodies politic’ in the
1960s,147 and one would need to read more today in its case-law about how
those political institutions relate not only to States but to their population.
Of course, the jurisdiction of some ICs may have to be amended in order
to enable them to receive applications and questions pertaining to contempor-
ary political and institutional questions in international law.
At this stage, one may object that ICs are precisely not the international
institutions one should expect or want to be ‘political’ or, at least, to reason
about States in a way that reveals their political dimension and legitimacy.148
It is arguably complicated enough to interpret international law on a universal
or regional plane, and meddling with the political dimension of international
law would only make things more controversial. That may be true, but there is
no way around this problem. It will not disappear by being hidden away
behind a legal formalist curtain and by giving into functionalist
146 See eg, Andrew Vincent, Theories of the State (Basil Blackwell, 1987).
147 See ICJ, Certain Expenses (n 54) pp 167–8.
148 See Keller/Heri (n 61) 122.
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considerations. We actually know this from domestic public law: consti-
tutional law judges have to decide on such issues daily and do no shy away
from the political dimension of the organisation of our public institutions
when doing so.
Of the three ICs discussed, there is one that clearly already embraces its
political role, despite the many controversies this has brought onto it, and
that is the ECtHR. It needs to do so even more openly in the area of statehood,
however, ﬁrst by acknowledging its jurisprudence on the topic, standing for it
and building it up even further. As I argued before, doing so comparatively
and normatively may help assuaging States’ resistance by opening to
various domestic conceptions and theories of statehood, by respecting subsi-
diarity in international statehood review and hence by approaching the inter-
national law of statehood as the common enterprise it was meant to be.
5. Conclusions
Why should contemporary international lawyers still care about the law of
statehood? And why should anyone expect contemporary ICs to have any-
thing meaningful to say about States?
I hope to have made at least four points towards replying to the second
question: ﬁrst, various ICs have and are still contributing in a decisive
fashion to the international law of statehood; second, they have done so in
various ways, thereby leading to the development of a plurality of types of sta-
tehoods under international law, either internationalised, democratic or man-
agerial and, sometimes, all of them at the same time; third, the jurisprudence
of statehood of those various ICs can and should be criticised for what they
have done and/or are doing to States and ultimately to their citizens, by allow-
ing the international law of statehood to develop in a largely imperialistic,
techno-scientiﬁc and de-politicised way; and, ﬁnally, the international juris-
prudence of statehood can and should also be reformed to become more uni-
versal, more normative and more political.
To go back to the ﬁrst question, the reason international lawyers should
care about statehood is that without a good grasp of States we cannot hope
to conceive and organise other international institutions, public or private.
At a time when no one knows exactly who is represented by whom on the
international plane, why those who make international law may actually
claim to bind us and who should be accountable to us in case of breach of
international law, this matters. With the international law of statehood,
indeed, we have gathered at least some answers to those questions, answers
it took centuries to debate over and carve out. This is why it is with them,
and their current legal status rather than a mythological Westphalian
concept, that we should try to ﬁnd the answers to the new questions other
international institutions raise for us.
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This is not only a nice theoretical endeavour, but a question of great prac-
tical urgency, both in the West and beyond. Indeed, if one refers to the norms
of the international law of statehood, as they have been gradually developed
by the jurisprudence of ICs over a century, most States on the planet would
be considered as ‘failed’ or, to use a more recent and politically correct
term, as ‘limited’ in their statehood. Why not consider, on the contrary,
that it is international law itself and in particular the international law of sta-
tehood that failed those States? In the second half of the twentieth Century,
the international law of statehood came with guarantees of new rights: equal-
ity for States and ultimately for their citizens, of course, but also self-determi-
nation, democracy and human rights. If we, international lawyers, are not true
to those guarantees, we will have failed the international dimension of the
modern project of statehood.
To quote Judge Forster inWestern Sahara, the problem lay originally in the
ICJ requiring, in its early case-law, that all States be ‘carbon copies of Euro-
pean institutions’.149 Nowadays, as I explained, the lack of interest of inter-
national lawyers for contextualisation and comparison in lieu of top-down
uniformisation is still a problem, and so is the lack of concern for the
moral justiﬁcations of statehood instead of techno-scientiﬁc truths or econ-
omic standards, and, more generally, for political government instead of econ-
omic governance. It is time for a change. One way to provoke this kind of
reform and trigger international institutional innovation may actually be to
make the most of the plurality of ICs and their existing jurisprudence of state-
hood rather than turn our back on them.
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